

Transcript of John Searle lecture where he admits Gibson was the ONLY one who got perception right!

[https://youtu.be/ve0c0B47xJw?si=SPu5INFYXO6A1\\_fJ&t=439](https://youtu.be/ve0c0B47xJw?si=SPu5INFYXO6A1_fJ&t=439)

Now, where are we? Well, we're now in the second part of the course where I'm giving you a theory about how the mind

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works. And essentially, that's a theory of intentionality and how it relates to the rest of the world.

Uh most

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discussions of intentionality in our intellectual tradition, I find hopelessly inadequate. Uh their idea of

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an intentional state, if you look in the literature, it's beliefs and desires, and they're okay, but they're very

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derivative. The basic forms of intentionality are the biologically primitive forms, perception and action

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and then other basic biological uh phenomena such as hunger and thirst

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and the various emotions such as lust and rage. All of those are loaded with

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intentionality and beliefs are way down the line. And then because they start

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with beliefs, a lot of philosophers will say crazy things. You can't have a belief unless you have a language and

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and uh animals can't have beliefs and desires and so on. I'm embarrassed by

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that and future generations will think we were ridiculous. On the other hand, I guess all generations are ridiculous. So

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maybe we're no different from others. Okay. Now I gave you the bare bones of a theory of intentionality

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and then the natural progression is to lecture on perception. But I went to action first. I'm not sure why. I guess

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I just felt like it. But I want you to get the idea that

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our philosophical tradition is very biased. It's biased in favor of epistemology.

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And the natural temptation is to think, well, what really matters in intentionality is perception and memory

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and belief. Well, they do matter, but action is a a fundamental form of

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intentionality. And it's a remarkable fact that we have the capacity to initiate

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action. How does it work? Well, in order to understand it, you have to understand

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consciousness. And you have to see, as I said in the discussion of consciousness that there

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is a basic distinction between what I call the passive and the active

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consciousness. I'm not sure that's the best terminology, but the idea is that when I look out at this room, it's not

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up to me what I see. It's fixed by the

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the u physical structure of the scene together with my perceptual apparatus.

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But when it comes to my actions, do I raise this arm or this arm? Do I speak loudly or softly? Do I speak at all or

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shut up? Do I talk about one thing or another thing? Those are up to me. And to see the special character of the

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experience, what I call in the book, the experience of acting. Imagine that your actions were like your perceptions. You

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just noticed uh that you were talking or walking. Uh you observe yourself talking

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or or walking. That's not how it works in real life. In real life, you have to make an effort. There has to be what I

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call the experience of acting. And my technical term for that is the

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intention in action. I mention that that I need a technical term because I need

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something to mark the special intentionality that goes with human actions. I and it's

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different from the intentionality of perception and it has the world to mind

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direction of fit and the mindto world direction of causation. It's my intention that causes my arm to go up.

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And that means the arm going up is a condition of satisfaction in the world that matches the mind. So it's world to

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mind direction of fit. But you get the world to mind direction of fit in virtue of the mind to world direction of

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causation. My mind has to want to bring about a change in the world. Now, when

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we get to uh perception, and I'm going to get to perception today, you'll see that it's a mirror image of that. It's a

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has a beautiful the intentionality of perception and action and uh you know to use the old

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time jargon of uh cognition and uh volition um that uh those they have a

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beautiful formal structure and when I if I get that far I'll put it on the blackboard for you so you can see the

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similarities and differences between cognition and vition. Okay. So I want

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you to understand that there is this special type of consciousness which is

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the consciousness of acting and the reason I'm I'm underlining this is that

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since daycart we have been obsessed in western culture with epistemology. We

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think the big deal in philosophy is to solve the problem of skepticism. We came

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out of that in the 20th century to some extent but not entirely. we're it's still with us uh to some extent. Um uh

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but the the the basic idea was look unless you can solve the problem of

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skepticism, unless you can solve the epistemic problems, you can't really go on in philosophy because unless you can

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uh prove that induction is a valid method of reasoning, then the sciences don't have any basis.

Unless you can

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prove uh that there is an objective ground for our ethical judgments, then ethics won't have an objective uh basis.

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Unless you can solve the other mind's problem, you won't have a a basis for the uh making ascriptions of intentional

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state of mental states to other people and so on. Now I think that if you look

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at this uh over the long hall I skepticism and epistemology don't occupy

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center stage in a way that they did a 100 years ago but they are still very  
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prominent. We still have a bias in favor of epistemology as a fundamental  
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branch of philosophy. I and what I'm suggesting is that skepticism is not the  
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fundamental problem. I'll get to the problem of skepticism, but I want you to see that that the  
way the mind relates  
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to reality, action is fundamental. I don't want to say it's equally fundamental as perception, but  
it's  
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close. Why am I hesitant to say that they're on a par? Well, you can imagine  
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a beast that had perceptions, but no actions. Imagine a beast that lives the  
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life of a tree. It just stands there and observes uh the passing scene. Uh it has  
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a cognition but no volition. But I don't think you can imagine the other side. You can't imagine a  
beast that could act  
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but couldn't perceive. Uh because unless you can see what you're doing or unless  
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you at least have minimal proprioception, unless you have some cognitive capacity uh for getting  
at  
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what you're doing, you won't be able to coordinate your actions. And in fact, of course, in real  
life, uh the uh the the  
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motor nervous system and the sensory nervous system are massively coordinated. So um much  
of your  
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perception is oriented with action in mind. And of course, as I just said, you  
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can't have your actions without perceptions. Uh there's a psychologist named Gibson who made a  
lot out of this.  
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And Gibson, I think he's on the right track. He exaggerates them. I guess we all do. But Gibson  
uh points out that  
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the standard literature is all about people seeing triangles or it's as if they're looking through  
them. the uh a  
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keyhole of a door and you have all these perceptual uh illusions that you can design. But in  
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fact in real life you don't just see objects but you see uh objects that you

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can act on. You see potential actions when you see an object. And Gibson's

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jargon for this was affordances. What Gibson says is uh that basically what

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you see is an affordance. So when you look at this thing, it affords one kind of action.

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When you look at this thing, it affords another kind of action. You can't drink out of uh this thing, but you can um

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you can certainly try to keep the rain off of this thing and so on with all other objects of the kind of useful

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objects in in your vicinity. You see them in terms of the potential actions. You see affordances in ra as opposed to

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colors and shapes. Uh, well, it's easy to exaggerate that. Um, uh, when I look

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at a ski slope, I think how I would ski it. Uh, but when I look at a rock face, I don't think how I would climb it

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because I'm not a climber. And when I look at the sky, I don't think, well, how I'd do anything. Maybe if I was a

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sky diver, I'd think, oh, this would be a great a great day to do skydiving. So, not every perception involves

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affordances. When I look at trees, I don't think, now this is how I'd climb that tree and this. No, I don't. I'm

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just not a tree climber. It's not my thing. I so uh not all perception is

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perception that's oriented to action but a good deal of it is. Okay. Now at the

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end last time I started telling you some of the complexities of the theory of

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action and I want you to see action is structured. Um the Mickey Mouse cases

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that we use for philosophical examples are selected for their simplicity. I

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raise my arm or I scratch my head. But of course again in real life your

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actions are immensely complicated and they stretch over time and the intention

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is action the intention in action is always specified as an answer to the

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question what are you doing now but notice you can say things like well I'm

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finishing my undergraduate degree in Berkeley before going to law school now that has a very great complexity. What

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it says is you're engaged in a complex set of actions over a period of time and you now have a prior intention in

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addition to those intention and action. You have a prior intention to go to law law school after you finish your

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undergraduate degree. And I've given you some of the apparatus for analyzing that structure about causal

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self-referentiality. Uh for example, in the difference between the presentation and the

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representation and above all uh the notion of the gap, the notion that you experience your actions as uh what

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you're doing as one among possible things that you could be doing. And the gap we're going to have to address in

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more detail. It is the problem of the freedom of the will. Whether it's an

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illusion or not, we do have the experience of making up our mind and deciding among alternatives where it's

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part of our experience that yes, I am could be doing I'm doing this but I could be doing something else and among

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the things that I'm now choosing between I have a genuine choice among different

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alternatives. All right. Now within the structure I said you need to distinguish

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between the causal by means of relation where you fire the gun by means of

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pulling the trigger. Uh you comb your hair by means of dragging uh it's not

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very hard for me because I don't have much left. But uh you drag the the teeth of the comb through your hair and so on

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through a large number of other cases. as a causal relation where you do one thing by means of doing something else.

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You start the car by means of turning the key in the ignition. But in addition

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for humans there is a constitutive by way of relation. I making the mark on  
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the ballot paper doesn't cause you to vote. It just counts as voting. It just  
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is voting. And that's the I call that the constitutive by way of relation. You  
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fire the gun by means of pulling the trigger. You start the car by means of  
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turning the key, but you vote by way of making the mark on paper or uh if it's a  
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a philosophy department meeting by way of raising your hand. The relation there is not causal  
but it's constitutive in  
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that doing that in that context constitutes doing such such and such a  
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higher level action. Uh now when we fully understand that it'll it's the key  
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that will unlock human civilization because what is special about human beings is their capacity  
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to create a whole set of structures where by acting within the structure you  
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can do things that constitute doing something else. right now I'm making noise through my  
mouth but that in this  
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context that constitutes giving a lecture in philosophy uh and so on with all of those things  
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that we think of as distinctly human reality money property government  
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marriage universities uh political elections all of those are cases of of  
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institutional structure that enable certain sorts of behavior to constitute  
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other sorts of behavior and essentially those are the power structures in our  
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society. What we do with all of that is create power relations. Um now I'm going  
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to tell you more about that when we get there. I haven't given you the tools yet to understand  
that. Right now we're just  
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at this stage where I want you to see the complex structure of human action. And then when we  
get to the problem of  
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explaining human behavior, you're going to see how we explain it with  
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intentional causation. We explain it by examining  
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uh the in the intentional contents that function causally in determining the  
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behavior. Not all explanations of uh behavior appeal to intentional causation. Sometimes there's  
just a

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tsunami uh that drowns a whole lot of other a whole lot of people and that's

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just a brute physical causation. But when it comes to things like bombing Japan, that is a brute  
physical cause

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that is I initiated by intentional causation. A decision has to had to be

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made. No decision was made that produced the earthquake and the tsunami. So you

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have both kinds of causation operating in human life. But if you want to

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understand what's special about human beings, you have to understand the role of intentional  
causation in explaining

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behavior, especially social behavior. Okay. Now I'm going to conclude the

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discussion of action and go on to perception. I'm going to give you now a summary of what I  
want you to understand

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about action. But first, are there any questions about what I've been saying so far? I've actually  
covered an awful lot

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of ground in this lecture and the last lecture. Yes.

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Well, the question was, do pre-reflective actions require an intention action? And you have to tell

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me the example. Um, walking around. Okay. Now, this is this is a a good

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case. Uh, when I'm walking around as I do now, I typically when I lecture, I

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pace around. Do I do that intentionally? Yes, it is an intentional inaction. Uh

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but it seldom rises to consciousness. I'm I'm I'm not thinking, geez, shall I go with the left foot  
or the right

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foot? I don't have to think about that. I just walk around. It just I I I read some one study  
somewhere that says your

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brain works better if you pace around. So, I think, okay, I'm I'm helping out my brain. Um but I  
Yes, you do have an

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intention and action, though it's not at the center of your attention. And you remember when I when we discussed the

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structure of consciousness, uh we discussed the distinction between the center and

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the periphery of consciousness. I'm conscious of walking around, but it's not at the center of my attention. It's

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like the lights overhead. I'm conscious of them, but they're not at the center of my attention.

However, the question

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raises a much deeper point, and that is this. Remember what I told you about the

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background? All of your intentionality uh functions relative to a set of

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background capacities and those divide broadly in to the uh the local uh

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cultural background and the deep background that's common to all human beings. Now one of the laws of if to put

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a grand title to it of the operation of intentionality is that intentionality tends to rise to

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the level of the background scale. Uh the level at which I'm operating now is

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to give a lecture on the intentionality of action and perception and my subsidiary intentionality like walking

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around or uttering words in English. All of that is governed by my higher level

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intention relative to my background abilities to give a lecture. See these movements I make in my mouth, they're

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all done intentionally. But I don't have to think, you know, I don't think now when you pronounce the T, you got to get

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the tongue next to the top of the mouth. I don't have to think that. I just talk and that and if you have to stop and

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think about these subsidiary actions, then it's likely to impede your efficiency. So intentionality rises to

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the level of your highest background skill. My background skill now is lecturing on the subject of the

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intentionality of perception and action. There are a whole lot of subsidiary actions that are part of that and those

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are intentional. They're not like the paristoic contraction of my gut which just goes on uh regardless of my

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intention. But at the same time they're governed by this higher level intention. It's only in virtue of the fact that I'm

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trying to give a lecture on intentionality that I waggle my tongue around and make these noises. Okay,

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that's a good question. Other questions? Now, I want everybody to understand this because I'm now going to summarize uh

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this stuff about action so we can go on with perception.

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Okay, everybody's up with this. Well, here I is the basic structure I want you to remember. In the case of action, you

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have to make a distinction which is not commonly made but I think it's obvious once you see it. You have to make a

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distinction between the prior intention and the intention in action. Uh the

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prior intention is a representation of the whole action and it's typically the

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result of a decision but I not always a lot of prior intention. You just decide you made up your mind to do something

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without thinking about it. So you have a decision-making process that results in

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a prior intention and typically though not always you reach the decision on the

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basis of beliefs and desires and the belief and desire produce a

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prior intention. And then the prior intention if you

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carry it out leads to an action but the action contains uh two components an

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intentional action together with a bodily movement or other condition of

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satisfaction. This relation is causal and this relation is causal. So you need

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the distinction between a prior intention and an intention action. Both are causally selfreflexive.

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Both have a causal condition in their conditions of satisfaction.

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In the case of the intention and action, the intention and action has to cause

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the bodily movement or other condition of satisfaction if it's to be satisfied.

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In the case of the prior intention, the prior intention has to cause the whole action. But it does that by way of

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causing the intention in action. The direction of fit of both of these both

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the prior intention and the intention in action is uphill from uh world to mind.

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But the direction of causation is downhill. The mind has to cause the

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change in the world. And there's a I'll get to I'll say more about that when we get to perception because

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perception is kind of the mirror image of that. Perception has the opposite direction of fit and direction of

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causation. Okay? So you got the distinction between the prior intention and the intention in action. You see

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that they're both causally self uh referential. Uh the direction of fit goes from the world to the mind and the

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direction of causation goes from the mind to uh uh the world. And then in the

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case of complex actions, there's an inner structure which contains both the

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by means of the causal by means of relations and the constitutive by way of

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relation. Now it's that complex structure that gives you the accordion

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effect. So you can say he fired the gun by means of pulling the trigger. uh he

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shot uh the uh archduke by means of of uh firing the gun. He killed the

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archduke by means of shooting him and so on through the other cases where you get this complex structure from the simplest

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action pulling the trigger uh to the complex action starting a war or avenging Serbia or whatever uh the goal

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might have been. Now, it's tempting to ask, well, are there some things you

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can do without intending to do anything by means of which or by way of which you

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do those things? And the answer is yes. Those are what are called basic actions.

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So, that's another notion we need is a notion of a basic action. Something you

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can do without intending to do something by way of which or by means of which you

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do it. and the then this complex relation whereby you can expand or

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contract the description of the action is called the accordion effect. So those

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are some other notions I want you to understand. I want you to understand the notion of the basic action and the

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accordion effect. Now there are two things uh that I want to emphasize. What

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is basic will depend on what your skill is. Uh for me uh speaking I uh

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pronouncing an English sentence is basic. I don't have to think how to do it. I and raising my arm is is basic. I

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just haul off and do it. And when you get to be a good skier, skiing

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a a gate or indeed a whole solemn course might be a basic action. You just haul off and do it.

You just do it as a as

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part of the continuous flow of your intentional action. But what's basic for one person might not be basic for

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another. If you're learning how to play tennis, uh you they I teach you how to do the toss, how to throw the ball up,

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uh so that you can hit it when you make your serve. And there the basic action

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would be throwing the ball up. When you get to be a good tennis player, just serving uh would be the uh uh the basic

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action. And again that itself will be part of a flow that's a manifestation of your background skills. So what's basic

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for one person will not be basic for another and what's basic for one person

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will vary in that person with that person's state of health or attention or

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or other capacities. Uh there are warounded people for example who can't

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just raise their arm as a basic action. They have to go first that far and then that far. they have to do a series of

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steps by means of which notice this jargon uh they manage to raise their

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arm. Okay. So those are the basic ideas that I want you to get about the

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structure of human action. Now that will will we'll have a deeper understanding

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of that when we get to intentional causation. uh there is a bias in our

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culture that thinks in the end uh all of this ought to be uh made

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subsidiary to a rigorous science of the brain and in a way that's right. If we

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know how the brain works then all of this ought to fall into place. But before we can get a science of the brain

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about human action, we have to have some conception of the various distinctions

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of the various logical and conceptual distinctions that we need to make. Okay.

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Now I'm going to turn to perception. So any other questions about action? I saw a hand up over here. You had your hand

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up. Yeah. Just about the basic actions. It seems like after you get the the basic motor skills of being able to move

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around almost almost any me anything that you do with your body any action becomes a basic action then you only

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have these higher purposes that you're responding to. Is that that's accurate? I think that's right. But let me expand

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on a little bit. I just repeat for the people at the back of the room. Uh he points out that once you have acquired

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the the various bodily skills um then they become basic actions and

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you then focus your attention on the higher order. uh actions that you're going to perform. I think that's right.

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When before I started this lecture, I walked here from my office. Now, walking from my office just a basic action. If

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somebody said, "Yeah, but how do you do it? Do you do two feet at once or one foot at a time or do you jump up and

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down or do you ever do any cartwheels along the way?" I don't have to answer any of those question. I just say I just

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walk. I just haul off and do it. There isn't any question. Well, how do you do it? And this is a if there is an has to

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be an intentionally intentionalistic answer to the question how do you do it

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then I that then it's not a a basic action. The basic action is something

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you do without intending to do anything by means of which or by way of which you do it. And it's interesting to look at

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textbooks on uh uh on physical skills. I when I first learned to ski, I I was an

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intellectual and I thought, you know, you ought to master the theory here. I even took the books on the slope with

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me. That's the dumbest thing you could possibly do. Um, and they would say things like, "Put the weight on the

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downhill ski." How, you know, how do you put the weight? Well, that'll tell you that. That's supposed to be a basic

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action. They won't tell you. Uh, if they say pick up the racket in your right hand, how do you pick it up? Well, they

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just, that's a basic action. So anything that you can do without intending to do anything else that's a basic action. Uh

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but um uh uh and again when you're learning a foreign language the only

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thing that I I like what I like most about French were the noises you can make uh in French

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and what I did was practice the noises. So almost anything somebody says to you it's okay to say

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and then there are various obscenities that I don't want to teach you now. there are French speakers present who would be shocked if I use them but there

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are certain expressions you can use uh in French which will give you a reputation for profundity and are

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useful in almost any circumstance. So if somebody says something, you have the faintest idea uh uh what he said, you

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can always say things like you mustn't exaggerate and that'll give

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you a reputation for great depth. Or another one I like is you grab your chin and say it all

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depends. I Okay, but in any case, these are basic actions when learning a

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foreign language. Now, I like German, too. But in German, I like the fact you can make a big mouthful of noises.

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Kite, you know, that means the guy's going fast. And part of the fun of speaking German is you always sound like

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a Nazi officer. Well, at least I do when I speak German, but nobody seems to mind. Uh, well,

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maybe that's maybe that's part of the problem that I have in Germany. Uh, okay. I anyway I'm digressing but

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the the basic the idea I want you to get is that human beings have this special capacity where they have not only causal

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means of by means of relation but they have all these constitutive by way of relations. Now animals have that uh as

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well but nothing like the complexity that we have. Uh when your dog wags it wags his tail and licks your hand, he is

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expressing his affection. Uh but it his wagging the tail and licking your hand

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doesn't cause him to express affection. It just constitutes it. So the animal does have a lower level constitutive by

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way of relations, but it doesn't vote in elections uh fill in its income tax form

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or get married. uh all of which are actions that require uh constitutive by

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way of relations. Okay. Shall we go on to perception then? New heading uh

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perception. The intentionality of perception. Now when we talk about perception I have

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to say a little bit about the history of the subject.

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the greatest single disaster in the history of philosophy over the past well

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it's getting on almost 400 years the mid 7th century 30 uh 350 years or more

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the greatest single disaster was the theory of perception uh that says it

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it's impossible for us to perceive the real world directly. All you can ever

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perceive are the contents of your own mind. And in Hume's you remember in Hume

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these are called impressions. In lock they're called ideas. In many 20th

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century philosophers they were called sense data. And the idea is that when I

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look at my hand I don't strictly see speaking see my hand. What I see is

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something going on in my mind. which is uh the image or sensatum or

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impression or idea of a hand. Uh and a way that this is put in the jargon is to

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say that a basic move in philosophy and all of the great philosophers almost

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without I can't think of any exceptions really of the traditional great philosophers from daycart

on uh reject

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the idea that you have direct perceptual access to the real world. Now that view that you directly

see the real world has

31:06

got a name. It's called naive realism. You want to be suspicious of these

31:12

jarens because of course different authors use uh the name naive realism differently. But in the

way that I am

31:19

using it, it just means that you perceive

31:25

objects and states of affairs directly without the intermediary of perceiving

31:33

something else by way of which you perceive them. Uh now there are indirect

31:39

perceptions. If I hear a sound in the street and I think it's a motorcycle,

31:46

then I might infer the presence of the motorcycle from the noises that I heard.

31:52

But in the standard case, when I'm standing looking at the motorcycle, I don't make any

inferences. I just

31:58

literally see the motorcycle. And that view has got a name as I use it. It's

32:06

called naive realism. And here is the embarrassing fact.

32:13

If you look at the history of philosophy from daycart on, there are

32:20

no naive realists among the great philosophers. Uh the way I read these

32:26

guys at least uh Lach, Barkley, Hume, Daycart, Linet, Spinoso, not to mention

32:31

Kant and Hegel all deny naive realism. Now I say that's the greatest single

32:38

disaster in philosophy. Why is it a disaster? It why is it a a disaster? It

32:45

makes the problem of skepticism insoluble. You can't solve the problem

32:51

of skepticism if you think it's impossible for us to see or otherwise

32:56

perceive objects and states of affairs in the real world. Daycart made heroic

33:02

efforts to solve the problem of skepticism. But on Daycart's view, I can't even see the piece of chalk

33:09

without God's help. I mean, it's only because I can assume that God is not a

33:14

deceiver that I can infer that I'm actually seeing the piece of chalk. And that's bad news uh for us atheists. Uh

33:22

because, you know, I can't always count on God. I And so, I have to have an alternative theory of perception. And

33:30

I'm going to tell you the reasons people rejected naive realism. uh but but they all rejected naive realism. And in the

33:36

case of Hume, he saw that skepticism follows. And he worked out the

33:42

implications. He worked out uh all of the possible skeptical results that you

33:48

get if you think that the only thing we really have direct access to are impressions and ideas. And you might

33:56

think, yeah, but where do you get these impressions? Don't they come from the real world?

Hume says, "Impressions

34:02

arise in the mind from unknown causes." Well, come on. I It's because I see my

34:08

end. Nope. Hume says, "You can't say that. All you can see is you have more impressions." And then when you get to

34:15

Kant, all hell breaks loose. Yes, you solve the problem of skepticism. All

34:20

right. But the way you solve it is by saying uh the real world is totally unknowable. The world of things in

34:27

themselves is unknowable. So the only act reality we can have access to is our

34:33

own representations and there we really can have uh knowledge about our own

34:38

representations and this when he spells it out you remember is Kant's Copernican revolution.

Instead of thinking uh that

34:46

our thoughts have to be responsible to objects in the world we think that

34:52

objects in the world have to be responsible to our thoughts. Well that sounds great. You know we're in charge.

34:58

Oh, but wait a second. Those objects in the world, they're not real objects in the real world.

They're just uh objects

35:05

in the world of our representation. Well, don't get me started on uh K that

35:11

I got so mad at that book, I decided to well, I exaggerated say to rewrite the

35:17

whole damn thing. But I first prepared a summary. And if anybody wants to know what Kant says in a critique of pure

35:23

reason, I prepared a summary of the whole book in plain English. Uh well

35:28

yeah plain English using the Chemnitz translation. Uh if anybody's interested in that or I could even put

35:34

it on the on Bspace uh and it is I I find it a useful summary when I want what

35:39

what did Kant say in the second transcendental deduction of the categories. Okay. Uh but the book is a

35:45

it it is I was the greatest philosopher who ever lived. I'm sorry about that but it's a fact. Um, now maybe if I knew

35:52

Aristotle better, I'd feel differently. But in any case, I Kant was a superior philosopher. It's just that the whole

35:59

thing is based on a false assumption. It's based on the rejection of naive realism. So the whole thing has the

36:06

form, well suppose 2 plus 2 equals 5. Uh, what results follow? And you get

36:12

stunning results indeed. But  $2+2$  doesn't equal 5. That is to say, uh,

36:17

naive realism has not been shown to be false by Kant. All right. What are the

36:23

reasons for rejecting naive realism? And that's my next topic. Why the the

36:28

conception of naive realism that I have is this. If you think, and I've drawn

36:33

this before, but I'll draw it again. If you think of here's me a perceiver and

36:39

here's the object then the intentionality of my perception reaches

36:44

right up to the object. I directly perceive the object. The visual

36:50

experience reaches right up to the object. I and this view I call naive

36:58

realism. Now the I don't have to write it down again. I already wrote it down.

37:03

Um uh the theory that I'm now going to present to you says that can't be right.

37:09

If there's anything we know is false, we know that naive realism is false. And

37:14

Hume, again, probably the best philosopher who ever wrote in the English language, thought naive realism

37:21

is so obviously false. I I don't even have to do what Barkley did, give you a

37:26

whole lot of arguments against it. He says, if you're tempted in naive realism, just push one eyeball. Okay,

37:32

you push one eyeball and the world I mean if you do this too much you get a headache. Okay, you can do it once in a

37:38

while but not to the point you get a headache. Uh and what I

37:44

Hume says if the if naive realism are right you'd have to say when you push one eyeball well you got two objects

37:51

there because the world doubles and of course it doesn't double so naiveism

37:57

must be false. All right. There are a whole family of arguments that reject

38:03

naive realism. I think the most important argument, the one that convinces most people is called the

38:09

argument from science. And the way that argument goes is this

38:15

argument from science says if you do a science of the brain and a science of

38:21

perception, what you discover is you don't actually see objects and states of

38:27

affairs in the world. What you see is the effect that the object produces on

38:35

your perceptual apparatus. So the light waves come in or as we now

38:42

call them photons come in. They stimulate the photo receptor cells of the retina and that sets up an

38:49

electrical impulse that goes uh over the optic chiasm through the lateral

38:55

geniculate nucleus back uh to V1 back to

39:00

uh the visual area one and then there's a whole lot of uh complex actual

39:05

feedback mechanisms between V1 and the lateral geniculate nucleus and the LGN

39:11

and then there are a whole series of processes that go through the visual cortex up uh to the frontal lobes of the

39:18

brain and finally there's a visual experience finally and a brain is slow

39:24

all of this can take a couple hundred milliseconds uh to occur uh you get a

39:31

conscious visual experience but that's what you actually see is the conscious

39:37

visual experience going on inside your brain.

39:43

So you don't see the real world. It's not like this.

39:48

It's rather [Applause] that this thing has a causal effect on

39:56

you where this is a cause causal relation and then inside here there is a

40:03

sense datum and that's what you see. Now I find it hard to draw that. So what I

40:08

the way I typically draw it is by getting it outside. And I think what the

40:16

sense datum theorist does is draw the line that represents the visual

40:23

perception out of the vertical and into the horizontal.

40:29

So it becomes itself the object of perception. So what you see is this

40:34

sense datum. this experience that's going on in your head. But then the

40:39

question arises, well, what's the relationship between the sense datum you do see and the object that you don't

40:46

see? Now the answer given to that by Daycart and Lach was that the object you

40:54

do see the sense data or as they call it the idea uh that you do see resembles or

41:01

at least resembles in certain respects the object that you don't see. Uh it

41:07

resembles it with respect to such things as the shape of the object. The number

41:14

how many objects are there? Is the object moving or at rest or the velocity

41:20

and they call these the primary qualities. So the idea is that the the

41:27

sense datum that you do see actually resembles the object. This is a

41:32

resemblance relation. Resemblance with respect to the primary qualities.

41:40

But there are these other qualities like color, taste, sound and smell. And those

41:46

are called secondary qualities. And there

41:52

the object doesn't actually have any color. It doesn't have a taste or a

41:59

sound or a smell. Those are systematic illusions created in us. And lock says

42:05

the secondary qualities are just the causal capacity that the object the

42:12

primary qualities the of the object has to produce in us certain sensations. So

42:20

colors on this view don't colors don't really exist. This bag isn't really red.

42:26

Rather red is a systematic illusion produced in us by the action of the

42:32

light reflectances on our sensory apparatus. So you get a resemblance

42:38

relation of the primary qualities. Yes, I actually do see the shape and the size

42:43

of the bag and I can see that it's moving or at rest and I can see that it's one bag and not two.

Those are the

42:50

primary qualities. But things like smell and color, taste and sound, those don't

42:56

exist in the real world. What actually exists in the real world are as lock says the powers of the primary qualities

43:04

to produce certain experiences in us. So this view has also got a name. I I my

43:13

original view is called naive realism. This one is called representative

43:18

realism. And it says you do not see the real

43:24

world, but you see the impacts that the real world has on your perceptual

43:30

apparatus. And you can find out about the real world because sometimes

43:38

the images, ideas, sense data that you do see actually resemble objects in the

43:45

world. and they resemble them with respect to the primary qualities and the secondary qualities are just systematic

43:53

illusions. So you don't on this view get skepticism about the real world. I'll

44:00

take question a second because you you can infer features of the world from

44:05

your experiences because your experiences actually look like the world with respect to the primary qualities.

44:12

And the way I think of the representative theory it's this. It's as if we could ne we were all our life was

44:18

spent inside a movie theater where you could see uh the uh things happening on

44:24

the screen. There's a world outside the movie theater but you can never see that world. All you can see is what's on the

44:31

movie screen. You never get outside your own experiences. I and this is I said is called the

44:38

representative theory representative realism and it is held very prominently by both daycart and lock with this

44:46

complexity uh that the representation I is accurate only as far as the primary

44:53

qualities are concerned the secondary qualities are systematic illusions okay

44:59

I think that's a disastrous move away from naive realism but it gets worse

45:05

Uh, and I'm going to tell you about Barkley and Hume and Kant and a whole lot of German philosophers whose names

45:11

start with H. I shudder when I think. But anyway, let's stop for a question. You had a question.

45:18

[Applause] Let's say you're observing what's going

45:24

on. You still have to like make so much data through your eyes. You still have to create representations in your head,

45:32

don't you? How can you you organize your experience

45:37

in your head. Yeah, I'm not um I'm not sure I'm understanding the question. Let me answer and then you tell me how I mis

45:43

misunderstood you. I the idea is if you take this very seriously on the idealist

45:49

view, your head exists in your mind as well. See, us naive realist think you've

45:55

really got a head and we really can see uh uh the head. But on the idealist, you

46:00

haven't got to that yet. But the head itself is just a collection of ideas. All everything that exists exists in the

46:07

mind. As Barkley says, there only two kinds of things that exist in reality.

46:12

Minds and ideas. Minds and the contents of ideas. Now the problem then is well

46:17

how do you organize these into objects? And Kant answered that with his theory

46:23

of the categories. The the mind imposes certain categories on the perceptions

46:29

that come into it. And those enable us to organize our mental experience into

46:35

experiences of objects and states of affairs that we can describe as a chair or a table. Incidentally, Kant is very

46:41

bad with examples. He gives you almost no examples, but you can kind of figure out what he's driving at. Now, did I

46:48

answer that question? Maybe not. Or maybe sort of. a bit more like you have any of your naive realist on the naive

46:56

realist view your represent your experiences are caused by objects acting  
47:01  
on your nervous system uh and the uh it's not up to you if I hold up this  
47:08  
piece of chalk in broad daylight then it will have a certain effect on my nervous system the effect  
that I call seeing the  
47:15  
chalk now there are ways of altering that and indeed there was a period in  
47:20  
the history of the this university. Well, I hope I none of you do this, but there was a period when  
people like to  
47:26  
get in what they called altered states of consciousness. And they did this by  
47:31  
putting various dreadful chemical substances into their brains. And if you want to see the effects,  
go down  
47:37  
Telegraph Avenue. There's still some I think there may still be some of them hanging around,  
some derelicts from the  
47:43  
1960s uh who who have the effects of this. But you can produce  
47:49  
uh you can as Bodil says you can disorder the senses. You can disorder the senses. So you no  
longer so the  
47:56  
world suddenly no longer looks like objects and states of affairs but it's all kind of a swirling uh  
uh mix of  
48:03  
colors. But that's a case where you uh those are cases where the sensory apparatus is interfered  
with in such a  
48:10  
way as to make normal perception impossible. Yes, Jennifer. Yeah. The question is more  
48:16  
how much vision is a function of expectation.  
48:22  
Yeah. That you get this conscious inflow and how much can you decide that you're and how  
selective is it? Okay. No,  
48:28  
that's a very good question and let me say a little bit about that. The brain is not a tabular raza a  
blank  
48:36  
slate and the and objects just impact on it. But the brain imposes a structure on  
48:42  
the sequence of perceptions. And one of the fascinating questions in vision science is how much  
structure does the  
48:49

brain uh impose? And uh what are the mechanisms by which that structure is

48:55

imposed? Now I want to say philosophically and this is a crucial point. Perception like action rises to

49:04

the level of your background abilities. So a lot of philosophers talk as if what I really see are colors and shapes, but

49:11

I don't see colors and shapes. What I see are actual people. If somebody says to me, well, what color shirt did that

49:16

guy have on? You recognize the guy. What color shirt? I often don't see the shirt. I don't pay any attention to the

49:22

shirt. I So my perception will rise to the level of my background abilities. I

49:27

see people. I I see cars. I don't see just colors and shapes. And that's the

49:33

way that my experiences, my um my upbringing, my experiences, my whole

49:40

life history has given me a set of capacities for perceiving certain things. Uh very I think a lot of people

49:46

just see cars. Uh if you care about cars, you don't just see cars. You see that's a a a 911 C4.

49:53

uh and you uh a model 993 or uh if you

49:59

see maybe if we were dress designers we would say we would say well we don't just see dress we see that's an early

50:04

Christian Dior or something like that so you will automatically categorize your perceptions according to the level of

50:11

your background skill and what are the mechanisms by which the brain does that I think that's a scientific question and

50:17

there are there are people in this university do who do it very well Steve Palmer is one of the best in the world

50:23

and before him we had Irvin Rock uh also who was these are the leading vision

50:29

scientists so we have very we do very good vision scientist and look at Steve's uh Steve has written a textbook

50:34

on exactly this subject uh okay uh yes

50:40

something I'm asking how your um knife

50:45

um realism um can um have a relationship

50:51

with your idea that our per visual experience is the representation of his

50:59

conditions of satis. Yeah. And every every

51:11

could be something problematic. The for example speaks about the the our brain

51:19

that makes images and I think that it is on the right that there are images would

51:26

mean distinguish the two parts in our brain. So that yes we

51:33

perceive in function of the action but uh we perceive uh some qualities of

51:40

object. there is another part that could represent could um be in connected with

51:48

the representation of objects and types of efforts. So I think that

51:54

scientifically the idea of representation as some start some force

52:01

and I think that your idea of intentional states um leave space for

52:08

the recognition of the importance uh of

52:14

well okay that's a complex question by professor Dorenzo but and I'll give a

52:19

rather simple answer to it right now because we're going to come back to these issues later. Uh

the deep question is how exactly does the perceptual

52:26

experience fix the conditions of satisfaction? And I haven't told you the

52:31

answer to that yet, but you can see it coming. Basically, we have a certain type of structure

52:37

and the the uh world impacts on our structure in certain ways and we have

52:43

both a biological structure of visual perception and also we have cultural structures. I mean the

52:50

ability to identify different kinds of cars or or different architectural styles or painting or uh paintings by

52:57

different painters. All of those are culturally determined as well. But now here is the point. In the case of

53:04

perception, there's no way you can separate the perceptual experience from

53:09

the determination of its conditions of satisfaction. Because there's no way I could have this experience without it

53:17

seeming to me that I'm seeing my hand. the conditions of satisfaction. The determination of the condition of

53:23

satisfaction is internal to the perceptual experience in a way that with a sentence it's a matter of convention.

53:30

The same sentence can be used to mean something different in different languages. But the conscious perceptual

53:37

experience has the conditions of satisfaction built into it. And you see

53:43

this quite dramatically if you take

53:49

cases that are ambiguous and I'll use the same uh boring example

53:57

because it's quite familiar and I used to be able to draw it uh where you have

54:04

what is either a duck looking that way, a duck looking

54:10

that way, or a rabbit looking that way. And there are several things uh to notice about this that I've called your

54:16

attention to before, but it's relevant to this particular discussion. Uh it the

54:22

actual marks on the blackboard don't look at all like either a duck or a rabbit. Uh if somebody sold you a duck

54:29

that looked like that. You say, "I want to buy a duck. Bring your duck over and it looked like that." You'd ask for your money back, you see? Or maybe you'd call

54:35

the the zoo and tell them, you know, you guys ought to see this duck. Uh so it

54:41

doesn't actually look like either a duck or a rabbit. And another interesting feature is once I've taught you to see

54:48

both uh the duck looking that way or the rabbit looking up that way, then you'll

54:56

see it as either one or uh the other. It's very hard to see it just as what it

55:01

is, a bunch of lines uh that it doesn't really resemble either a duck or a

55:07

rabbit. you na your brain will naturally tend to organize it. Uh now nobody

55:13

thinks it's a real duck or a real rabbit. It's a picture duck and a picture uh rabbit. Another interesting

55:19

thing is you can't see both at once. At least I can't. I mean why not? Well, you just I mean that that's the way the

55:25

brain works. It organizes it in such a way that you this degenerate stimuli that you can see a duck or a rabbit. Uh

55:33

but in all of these cases the perception you have the condition of satisfaction a

55:39

picture of a duck or a picture of a rabbit which is the condition of satisfaction in these cases the p the

55:44

condition of satisfaction is fixed by the content of the visual experience. uh

55:50

it's not I it isn't like a sentence in a foreign language where you can under you

55:57

can see the sentence but if you don't know the language then you the sentence

56:03

doesn't fix the condition of satisfaction so here's a German sentence if you don't know German then it's just

56:11

uh noises when you pronounce it esagnet but the relationship between this and

56:17

its condition of satisfaction is conventional we have a conventional meaning attaching to it.

Whereas in the

56:23

case of perceptual experiences, it is in general not conventional. It's a matter of the physiology of perception as well

56:30

as the cultural background that you have acquired. Yes.

56:40

Yeah. So it seems that the structure of intention is stable but the actual

56:45

representations are switching. Doesn't that suggest that you're using

56:51

the underlying structure? The structure you see is stable that but here's the

56:56

striking and this is the the thing that's amazing about all of these phenomena. The stimulus is constant. It

57:05

it isn't that the the the blackboard changed. It's exactly the same stimulus. And yet there's no question the

57:10

experience is different. you have a different experience with exactly the same stimulus. I and the I mean one of

57:19

the way to put the question is how is it exactly uh that the brain knows which I

57:27

stimulus to interpret the input as because it does the brain will pick out

57:32

this and not nobody will say well that's Barack really Barack Obama or General de Gaul and that's because the structure of

57:39

the stimulus doesn't admit that interpretation but in the in the cases that we've been describing the impact of

57:46

the stimulus on the structure of the brain by way of the visual apparatus gives you a perceptual experience with

57:52

a specific intentional content. I'm not sure that that's what you were driving at, but that's a part of what I want to

57:58

say. Do you want to say some more? I'm justing that because there's that interpretation that representation

58:06

important part. Well, it is and that is without the

58:12

capacity you have for interpretation. You can't get these two interpretations of that. See, my dog, I mean, he's very,

58:18

he's a lovely and intelligent dog. He can't see pictures. He can't even pictures even of me. He doesn't

58:25

recognize the picture. I'm on television. He doesn't pay any attention. It doesn't interest him. So, the capacity to see this as a picture is

58:32

already a remarkable capacity. And I don't know which primates have it and which don't.

Jennifer. Yeah. I think the

58:37

question

58:43

he's pointing out is the role of representation is playing every is non-trivial. Oh yeah. See I mean if this

58:50

really were naive realis is having a causal impact whatever it is

58:56

you're seeing as culturally acclimated to see it and that's I mean this is going back to the analogy from science.

59:02

Yeah question. Okay. No, that naive realist is not denying that the structure of the  
59:10  
intentional content is partly fixed by what's in your head prior to the  
59:15  
experience. If you had never seen a duck or a rabbit or a picture, you couldn't do anything uh  
with this. The naive  
59:23  
realism is opposed to representative realism. See, the representative realist  
59:29  
says, well, you do have access to the real world, but only indirectly. you perceive representations  
and they're  
59:35  
like pictures of the real world. The naive realist says or sometimes another word for naive  
realism is direct realism  
59:42  
and maybe that's a better term. Uh because what it says is you just see the world. Now there's  
another problem for  
59:49  
the representative theory and that is how does it avoid the homunculus fallacy  
59:56  
and you all know the homunculus fallacy. The homunculus fallacy says,  
1:00:02  
well, the way to answer the question how you see anything, and you'd be surprised how many  
people commit the homunculus  
1:00:07  
fallacy, even a a trained specialist in the field. The monulus fallacy says  
1:00:14  
when you see the object, it's a tree here. Uh it's because  
1:00:21  
uh the object uh a has um  
1:00:29  
emits light reflectances that strike the eyeball and then that sets up a series  
1:00:36  
of electrical neural stimuli that go to the back of the brain. And back there  
1:00:42  
there's a little guy with a television set and he is busy looking with his  
1:00:49  
remote control at the picture of the tree that comes on the television  
1:00:54  
screen. That's the homunculus fallacy. Homunculus means little man or little person. And the  
hunculus fallacy says  
1:01:01  
when you see anything, it's because there is a little person inside your head looking at a  
television set. Now  
1:01:08

you all can see that. That's a ridiculous theory. And I deliberately drew this picture to make its ridiculousness obvious. Uh what's wrong

1:01:15

with it is uh what about the little guy here watching the television set? Does

1:01:22

he also have a homunculus inside his head? And then you see an infinite regress growing.

However, the homunculus

1:01:30

fallacy just won't go away. I in Francis Crick and Kristoff Cox's work uh they

1:01:39

say well you just do have to have a homunculus uh back there uh controlling

1:01:45

uh the input. You don't get an infinite regress. There's just a single homunculus. No, that's not going to

1:01:50

work. But the homunculus fallacy is always a danger for the rep or for anybody's theory of perception but

1:01:55

perceptive for the representative theory because what the representative theorist says is what you actually see is

1:02:03

something going on inside your head and then it looks like you've got to have a monulus in there looking at the thing

1:02:09

you see that's going on in your head. Okay. Now uh yes

1:02:17

now I am Yeah. Okay. For you it's about content of perception. Yes. The content

1:02:23

of content and content of perception for it can't be representational. It's always present.

Presentational. Okay.

1:02:30

Let me say that. Now, we've been using the word representation without embarrassment. But I'm embarrassed. So,

1:02:35

let me say the the content of the intention and action and the content of

1:02:41

the perception is always presentational. You actually see the object. You're not

1:02:47

you don't do not perceive just a representation of the object. The sentence is a representation.

1:02:54

The relation between the picture of the duck and an actual duck is

1:03:00

representational. But the what you actually see is not a representation. It's a presentation. You actually see

1:03:07

the the real world is presented to you. And now this is not a trivial result.

1:03:12

I'm going to tell you some of the consequences of that later. uh that perception unlike thought has not only

1:03:20

an immediacy you're immediately in contact with the environment but it's it

1:03:25

has a nondetachability in the case of your perception you can't detach the thing you're seeing from the

1:03:32

perception of it you see with your representation you decide somebody says form a mental image of the Eiffel Tower

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okay I do that okay now form a mental image of the Empire State Building or the Golden Gate Bridge I can do that I

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form these different mental images. In each case, the representation is detachable from the thing that it's a

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representation of. But in the case of rep of presentations, you can't do that.

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I now have a visual experience of this hand. And I can't shuffle it around. I

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cannot manipulate it in the way I can manipulate representations. Now, there's

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another fascinating I haven't got to the intentionality of visual experience, but I'm going to get to it. We won't make it

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today, but I'll certainly get to it on Thursday. There's a fascinating point that has

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confused a lot of philosophers, and it's this. If you ask me, what do you now see? I will describe the scene. Well,

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they're all these people, all of these uh uh philosophers uh some taking notes,

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some not taking notes. And I'll describe the chairs and the walls and so on. I'll describe the scene. Now, if it's

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somebody says to me, "Now, describe your visual experience." I'll give you the

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same description, except if I'm a cautious philosopher, I'll paraphrase it with I'll preface it with something

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like, "Well, it seems to me that I see or I have a visual experience which is

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such that I am seeing." And then the same description follows. Exactly. Take the simple case. Describe your visual

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experience. I see a hand. describe the object you see a hand. It's the same

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description. Now, a lot of people have been confused by that fact into thinking, well, then there aren't any

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such things as visual experiences except maybe in oddball hallucination cases. Uh the only

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part of the vision is the actual object that the vception

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is just a relation between you and an object. But that won't do because of course the visual experience is entirely

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in my head and the objects and states of affairs I see are in the real world. Why

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then do we give exactly the same description? My visual experience I see a hand. What do you see a hand? Now why

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is the description the same if the visual experience in my head and the hand is out there? And you know the

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answer to that now. It's the intentionality of the visual experience that determines its conditions of

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satisfaction. Okay. Now, that seems to me exactly the right way to describe perception. The

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visual experience gives you a presentational intentionality that has as its condition of

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satisfaction the presence and features of the object together with the causal condition. They have to cause the visual

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experience. Why isn't that obvious to everybody? Well, the there are two sets

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of answers uh two sets of arguments against naivalism. The first is the

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argument from science and that's the one that impresses people like uh Francis

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Crick and Kristoff and a whole lot of other people. And that argument says we know from science that you can't see the

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real world. All you can see is the effect that the real world has on your

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perceptual apparatus. But there's another argument that it is less common among scientists

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but it's I think had a big effect on philosophers and that's the argument from illusion and the argument from

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illusion says you could have exactly this visual

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experience but all the same there's no hand there it's a hallucination

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so what do you see in in this case now I see my hand. But let's suppose that it's

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a hallucination that there's no hand there. Well, what do you see in the hallucination case? Well, so the

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argument goes, you do see something. I mean, it's just like seeing a hand. So,

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what is it that you see? Well, you can't say I see a hand because there's no hand there if it's a hallucination case. All

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right. Well, what do you see? Well, you see a hallucinatory hand or you see the impression of a hand or an image of a

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hand. uh you see something uh and we might as well have a name for those things. We could call it the appearance

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of a hand or a a term that a lot of people like. You see the sense datum of a hand. But now then if you're going to

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see in the hallucination case you don't see the hand but only the sensatum of a

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hand then you should say the say the same thing in the non-h hallucinatory case in the ver so-called veridical case

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because the experience is qualitatively indistinguishable the idea is in this

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case if it's a hallucination I don't see my hand but only the sensatum of a hand

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then in the veridical in the real case where there's really a hand there, I should say the same thing because they're indistinguishable. There's

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they're qualitatively the same whether you're having a hallucination or not. So, the argument from illusion has lots

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of different variations and I'll go through some of them. Uh I I I'll go through in more detail next time, but

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the basic structure of the argument from argument from illusion is this. You

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could have exactly this experience and not be seeing anything or not be seeing

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things the way they really are. But if that's right, then what do you see in the hallucination case?

You see

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something, but it can't be a material object. But what is it that you see? Well, it's an impression or sens. But

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now comes the next crucial step. If you don't see a material object in the hallucination case, then you should say

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you don't see a material object in any case because they're indistinguishable

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because the quality of the experience, the quality of what's seen is exactly

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the same in the hallucination case as it is in the real case. Does

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everybody follow this argument? And this is an argument I think it's a terrible argument by the way, but I'm going to tell you what's wrong with it later. But

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but it's an argument that's convinced a lot of people. Incidentally, there's an odd feature to this discussion and that

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is philosophers talk as if hallucinations are the most common thing in the world. You know, you might have hallucinations before breakfast. I've

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never had a hallucination. I hope I never do. Uh I I I when and they see a

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lot of it's culturally determined as I may have mentioned to you that uh uh when the British drink too much, they

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don't see pink elephants, they see pink rats. I've never seen a pink elephant or a pink rat. But in any case, uh

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hallucinations, philosophers talk as if everybody has hallucinations, but they don't. It's a very unusual thing.

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However, they do exist. I mean uh in the case of of schizophrenia people hear

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voices and they literally have a hallucination of hearing uh voices on

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sometimes with tragic consequences. Okay, I haven't given you the whole argument from illusion but I want you to

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see the basic structure of it. The basic structure is whatever experience you're

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having you think it's of the real world you could have exactly that experience and be mistaken.

But in the mistaken

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case, you still see something but you don't see material objects. What do you see? You see sense data. But now if you

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don't see real objects but only sense data in that case then you say you

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should say in every case you only see sense data. But then if uh because the

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cases are indistinguishable qualitatively the same. But now then the question arises what's the relationship

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between the sense data that you do see? I mean I'm looking at my hand. What's the relation between the sense data that

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I do see and the hand that I don't see? Now you know the representative theorist

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said well the sense data is a kind of picture of the real object

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because it resembles uh the shape and number of the object. A number of fingers and so on is all resembled.

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There's a resemblance, a picturing relation between the sense data and the object. Now, Barkley looked at this

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picture and thought saw that doesn't make any sense. You can't say the sense

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data that you do see resembles an object that's invisible. It would be as if a guy said, I have two cars in my garage

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that look exactly alike, but the one on the right is invisible. If it's invisible, it doesn't look like

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anything. Now similarly if the real world is invisible if it's imperceptible

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then it can't resemble anything that you can see. So Barkley and Hume instead of

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going back to the representative theory or better still back to nominalism just got rid of this part of the picture altogether

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together and said all we can ever perceive are our own impressions. And

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indeed that's what the world consists in. It consists for Barkley in what he

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called ideas, what Hume called impressions. Now Hume says in effect in

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his theory of perception, he says Barkley was right, but it's unbelievable. Nobody can believe it.

So

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I you you're going to go on believing naive realism and I'll tell you why you believe it, why you can't help believing

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it, but it's mistaken. So Hume is naturalistic. He comes up with skeptical results but then says well the mind will

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come to the rescue and you will continue to believe a lot of superstitions like naive realism. And this view that says

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all you perceive are ideas in different versions is called either phenomenalism

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phenomenalism or idealism. The idea that all that

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really exists are ideas. There are important differences between phenomenalist and idealism but the basic

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idea is the same. The only reality that exists is the reality of experiences.

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Okay, look, I have to stop a couple minutes early because I have an appointment, but we'll go on with this on Thursday. And I think you should hand

English (auto-genera